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Abstract. A mediator implements a correlated equilibrium when it pro-
poses a strategy to each player confidentially such that the mediator’s
proposal is the best interest for every player to follow. In this paper,
we present a mediator that implements the best correlated equilibrium
for an extended El Farol game with symmetric players. The extended El
Farol game we consider incorporates both negative and positive network
effects.
We study the degree to which this type of mediator can decrease the
overall social cost. In particular, we give an exact characterization of Me-
diation Value (MV ) and Enforcement Value (EV ) for this game. MV is
the ratio of the minimum social cost over all Nash equilibria to the min-
imum social cost over all mediators of this type, and EV is the ratio of
the minimum social cost over all mediators of this type to the optimal
social cost. This sort of exact characterization is uncommon for games
with both kinds of network effects. An interesting outcome of our results
is that both the MV and EV values can be unbounded for our game.
Keywords: Nash Equilibria, Correlated Equilibria, Mediators and Net-
work Effects.
1 Introduction
When players act selfishly to minimize their own costs, the outcome with respect
to the total social cost may be poor. The Price of Anarchy [1] measures the
impact of selfishness on the social cost and is defined as the ratio of the worst
social cost over all Nash equilibria to the optimal social cost. In a game, with
a high Price of Anarchy, one way to reduce social cost is to find a mediator of
expected social cost less than the social cost of any Nash equilibrium.
In the literature, there are several types of mediators [2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11].
In this paper, we consider only the type of mediator that implements a correlated
equilibrium (CE) [12].
A mediator is a trusted external party that suggests a strategy to every
player separately and privately so that each player has no gain to choose another
strategy assuming that the other players conform to the mediator’s suggestion.
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The algorithm that the mediator uses is known to all players. However, the
mediator’s random bits are unknown. We assume that the players are symmetric
in the sense that they have the same utility function and the probability the
mediator suggests a strategy to some player is independent of the identity of
that player.
Ashlagi et al. [13] define two metrics to measure the quality of a mediator:
the mediation value (MV ) and the enforcement value (EV ). In our paper, we
compute these values, adapted for games where players seek to minimize the
social cost. The Mediation Value is defined as the ratio of the minimum social
cost over all Nash equilibria to the minimum social cost over all mediators. The
Enforcement Value is the ratio of the minimum social cost over all mediators to
the optimal social cost.
A mediator is optimal when its expected social cost is minimum over all me-
diators. Thus, the Mediation Value measures the quality of the optimal mediator
with respect to the best Nash equilibrium; and the Enforcement Value measures
the quality of the optimal mediator with respect to the optimal social cost.
1.1 El Farol Game
First we describe the traditional El Farol game [14,15,16,17]. El Farol is a tapas
bar in Santa Fe. Every Friday night, a population of people decide whether or
not to go to the bar. If too many people go, they will all have a worse time
than if they stayed home, since the bar will be too crowded. That is a negative
network effect [18].
Now we provide an extension of the traditional El Farol game, where both
negative and positive network effects [18] are considered. The positive network
effect is that if too few people go, those that go will also have a worse time than
if they stayed home.
Motivation. Our motivation for studying this problem comes from the following
discussion in [18].
“It’s important to keep in mind, of course, that many real situations in fact dis-
play both kinds of [positive and negative] externalities - some level of participation
by others is good, but too much is bad. For example, the El Farol Bar might be
most enjoyable if a reasonable crowd shows up, provided it does not exceed 60.
Similarly, an on-line social media site with limited infrastructure might be most
enjoyable if it has a reasonably large audience, but not so large that connecting
to the Web site becomes very slow due to the congestion.”
We note that our El Farol extension is one of the simplest, non-trivial prob-
lems for which a mediator can improve the social cost. Thus, it is useful for
studying the power of a mediation.
Formal Definition of the Extended El Farol Game. We now formally de-
fine our game, which is non-atomic [19,20], in the sense that no individual player
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Fig. 1. The individual cost to go f(x).
has significant influence on the outcome; moreover, the number of players is very
large tending to infinity. The (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game has three parameters c, s1
and s2, where 0 < c < s1 and s2 > 0. If x is the fraction of players to go, then
the cost f(x) for any player to go is as follows:
f(x) =
{
c− s1x 0 ≤ x ≤ cs1 ,
s2(x− cs1 ) cs1 ≤ x ≤ 1.
(1)
and the cost to stay is 1. The function f(x) is illustrated in the two plots of
Figure 1.
Our Contributions. The main contributions of our paper are threefold:
– We design an optimal mediator, which implements the best correlated equi-
librium for an extension of the El Farol game with symmetric players. No-
tably, this extension incorporates both negative and positive network effects.
– We give an exact characterization of the Mediation Value (MV ) and the
Enforcement Value (EV ) for our game.
– We show that both the MV and EV values can be unbounded for our game.
Paper Organization. In Section 2, we discuss the related work. Section 3 states
the definitions and notations that we use in the El Farol game. Our results are
given in Section 4, where we show our main theorem that characterizes the best
correlated equilibrium, and we compute accordingly the Mediation Value and
the Enforcement Value. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and discusses
some open problems.
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2 Related Work
2.1 Mediation Metrics
Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [21] analyze the price of anarchy and the price
of stability for Nash and correlated equilibria in linear congestion games. A
consequence of their results is that the EV for these games is at least 1.577 and
at most 1.6, and the MV is at most 1.015.
Brandt et al. [22] compute the mediation value and the enforcement value
in ranking games. In a ranking game, every outcome is a ranking of the players,
and each player strictly prefers high ranks over lower ones [23]. They show that
for the ranking games with n > 2 players, EV = n − 1. They also show that
MV = n − 1 for n > 3 players, and for n = 3 players where at least one player
has more than two actions.
The authors of [3] design a mediator that implements a correlated equilibrium
for a virus inoculation game [24,25]. In this game, there are n players, each
corresponding to a node in a square grid. Every player has either to inoculate
itself (at a cost of 1) or to do nothing and risk infection, which costs L > 1. After
each node decides to inoculate or not, one node in the grid selected uniformly
at random is infected with a virus. Any node, v, that chooses not to inoculate
becomes infected if there is a path from the randomly selected node to v that
traverses only uninoculated nodes. A consequence of their result is that EV is
Θ(1) and MV is Θ((n/L)1/3) for this game.
Jiang et al. [26] analyze the price of miscoordination (PoM) and the price
of sequential commitment (PoSC) in security games, which are defined to be
a certain subclass of Stackelberg games. A consequence of their results is that
MV is unbounded in general security games and it is at least 4/3 and at most
e
e−1 ≈ 1.582 in a certain subclass of security games.
We note that a poorly designed mediator can make the social cost worse than
what is obtained from the Nash equilibria. Bradonjic et al. [27] describe the Price
of Mediation (PoM) which is the ratio of the social cost of the worst correlated
equilibrium to the social cost of the worst Nash equilibrium. They show that
for a simple game with two players and two possible strategies, PoM can be as
large as 2. Also, they show for games with more players or more strategies per
player that PoM can be unbounded.
2.2 Finding and Simulating a Mediator
Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [28] develop polynomial time algorithms for
finding correlated equilibria in a broad class of succinctly representable multi-
player games. Unfortunately, their results do not extend to non-atomic games;
moreover, they do not allow for direct computation of MV and EV, even when
they can find the best correlated equilibrium.
Abraham et al. [29,30] describe a distributed algorithm that enables a group
of players to simulate a mediator. This algorithm works robustly with up to
linear size coalitions, and up to a constant fraction of adversarial players. The
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result suggests that the concept of mediation can be useful even in the absence
of a trusted external party.
2.3 Other Types of Mediators
In all equilibria above, the mediator does not act on behalf of the players. How-
ever, a more powerful type of mediators is described in [2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11], where
a mediator can act on behalf of the players that give that right to it.
For multistage games, the notion of the correlated equilibrium is generalized
to the communication equilibrium in [31,32]. In a communication equilibrium,
the mediator implements a multistage correlated equilibrium; in addition, it
communicates with the players privately to receive their reports at every stage
and selects the recommended strategy to each player accordingly.
3 Definitions and Notations
Now we state the definitions and notations that we use in the El Farol game.
Definition 1. A configuration C(x) characterizes that a fraction of players, x,
is being advised to go; and the remaining fraction of players, (1 − x), is being
advised to stay.
Definition 2. A configuration distribution D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xk), pk)} is a
probability distribution over k ≥ 2 configurations, where (C(xi), pi) represents
that configuration C(xi) is selected with probability pi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Note that
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, 0 < pi < 1,
∑k
i=1 pi = 1 and if xi = xj then i = j for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k.
For any player i, let E iG be the event that player i is advised to go, and CiG
be the cost for player i to go (when all other players conform to the advice).
Also let E iS be the event that player i is advised to stay, and CiS be the cost for
player i to stay. Since the players are symmetric, we will omit the index i.
A configuration distribution, D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xk), pk)}, is a correlated
equilibrium iff
E [CS |EG] ≥ E [CG|EG],
E [CG|ES ] ≥ E [CS |ES ].
Definition 3. A mediator is a trusted external party that uses a configuration
distribution to advise the players such that this configuration distribution is a
correlated equilibrium. The set of configurations and the probability distribution
are known to all players. The mediator selects a configuration according to the
probability distribution. The advice the mediator sends to a particular player,
based on the selected configuration, is known only to that player.
Throughout the paper, we let n be the number of players.
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4 Our Results
In our results, we assume that the cost to stay is 1; we justify this assumption
at the end of this section. Our first results in Lemmas 1 and 2 are descriptions
of the optimal social cost and the minimum social cost over all Nash equilibria
for our extended El Farol game. We next state our main theorem which charac-
terizes the best correlated equilibrium and determines the Mediation Value and
Enforcement Value.
Lemma 1. For any (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game, the optimal social cost is (y
∗f(y∗)+
(1− y∗))n, where
y∗ =

1
2 (
c
s1
+ 1s2 ) if
c
s1
≤ 12 ( cs1 + 1s2 ) ≤ 1,
c
s1
if 1s2 <
c
s1
,
1 otherwise.
Proof. By Equation (1), f(x) has two cases. Let f1(x) be f(x) for x ∈ [0, cs1 ],
and let f2(x) be f(x) for x ∈ [ cs1 , 1]. Also let h1(x) be the social cost when
0 ≤ x ≤ cs1 , and let h2(x) be the social cost when cs1 ≤ x ≤ 1. Thus, h1(x) =
(xf1(x) + (1− x))n and h2(x) = (xf2(x) + (1− x))n.
We know that h1(x) is minimized at x =
c
s1
. In addition, we know that h2(x)
is a quadratic function with respect to x, and thus it has one minimum over
x ∈ [ cs1 , 1] at x = y∗, where:
y∗ =

1
2 (
c
s1
+ 1s2 ) if
c
s1
≤ 12 ( cs1 + 1s2 ) ≤ 1,
c
s1
if 12 (
c
s1
+ 1s2 ) <
c
s1
,
1 otherwise.
Let h∗ be the optimal social cost. Then h∗ = min(h1( cs1 ), h2(y
∗)). Since
f1(
c
s1
) = f2(
c
s1
), we have h1(
c
s1
) = h2(
c
s1
). Hence, h∗ = min(h2( cs1 ), h2(y
∗)).
This implies that h∗ = h2(y∗). uunionsq
Lemma 2. For any (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game, if f(1) ≥ 1, then the best Nash
equilibrium is at which the cost to go in expectation is equal to the cost to stay;
otherwise, the best Nash equilibrium is at which all players would rather go. The
social cost of the best Nash equilibrium is min(n, f(1) · n).
Proof. There are two cases for f(1) to determine the best Nash equilibrium.
Case 1: f(1) ≥ 1. Let Ny be a Nash equilibrium with the minimum social cost
over all Nash equilibria and with a y-fraction of players that go in expectation. If
f(y) > 1, then at least one player of the y-fraction of players would rather stay.
Also if f(y) < 1, then at least one player of the (1− y)-fraction of players would
rather go. Thus, we must have f(y) = 1. Assume that each player has a mixed
strategy, where player i goes with probability yi. Recall that Ny has a y-fraction
of players that go in expectation. Thus, y = 1n
∑n
i=1 yi. Then the social cost is∑n
i=1(yif(y) + (1− yi)), or equivalently, n.
Case 2: f(1) < 1. In this case, the best Nash equilibrium is at which all players
would rather go, with a social cost of f(1) · n.
Therefore, the social cost of the best Nash equilibrium is min(n, f(1) ·n). uunionsq
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Theorem 1. For any (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game , if c ≤ 1, then the best correlated
equilibrium is the best Nash equilibrium; otherwise, the best correlated equilibrium
is D{(C(0), p), (C(x∗), 1− p)}, where λ(c, s1, s2) = c( 1s1 + 1s2 )−
√
c( 1s1
+ 1s2
)(c−1)
s2
,
x∗ =

λ(c, s1, s2) if
c
s1
≤ λ(c, s1, s2) < 1,
c
s1
if λ(c, s1, s2) <
c
s1
,
1 otherwise.
and p = (1−x
∗)(1−f(x∗))
(1−x∗)(1−f(x∗))+c−1 . Moreover,
1) the expected social cost is (p+ (1− p)(x∗f(x∗) + (1− x∗)))n,
2) the Mediation Value (MV) is min(f(1),1)p+(1−p)(x∗f(x∗)+(1−x∗)) and
3) the Enforcement Value (EV) is p+(1−p)(x
∗f(x∗)+(1−x∗))
y∗f(y∗)+(1−y∗) , where
y∗ =

1
2 (
c
s1
+ 1s2 ) if
c
s1
≤ 12 ( cs1 + 1s2 ) ≤ 1,
c
s1
if 1s2 <
c
s1
,
1 otherwise.
.
Due to the space constraints, the proof of this theorem is not given here.
The following corollary shows that for c > 1, if λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1, then the best
correlated equilibrium is the best Nash equilibrium, where all players would
rather go.
Corollary 1. For any (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game, if c > 1 and λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1
then MV = 1.
Proof. By Theorem 1, when λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1, x∗ = 1 and p = 0. Now we
prove that if λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1, then the best correlated equilibrium is the best
Nash equilibrium of the case f(1) < 1 in Lemma 2. To do so, we prove that
λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1⇒ f(1) < 1.
Now assume by way of contradiction that λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1⇒ f(1) ≥ 1. Recall
that f(1) = s2(1 − cs1 ). Then λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1 ⇒ cs1 + 1s2 ≤ 1, or equivalently,
λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1 ⇒ cs1 + 1s2 ≤ λ(c, s1, s2). Also recall that λ(c, s1, s2) = c( 1s1 +
1
s2
)−
√
c( 1s1
+ 1s2
)(c−1)
s2
. Thus, we have:
λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1 ⇒ c
s1
+
1
s2
≤ c( 1
s1
+
1
s2
)−
√
c( 1s1 +
1
s2
)(c− 1)
s2
⇒ s2 · c
s1
≤ −1,
which contradicts since s1, s2 and c are all positive. Therefore, for c > 1 and
λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1, MV must be equal to 1. uunionsq
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Now we show that MV and EV can be unbounded in the following corollaries.
Corollary 2. For any (2 + , 2+1− ,
1
 )-El Farol game, as → 0, MV→∞.
Proof. For any (2 + , 2+1− ,
1
 )-El Farol game, we have f(1) = 1. By Theorem 1,
we obtain x∗ = 1− , f(x∗) = 0 and p = 1+2 for  ≤ 12 (
√
3− 1). Thus we have
lim
→0
MV = lim
→0
min (f(1), 1)

1+2 + (
1+
1+2 )
=∞.
uunionsq
Corollary 3. For any (1 + , 1+1− ,
1
 )-El Farol game, as → 0, EV→∞.
Proof. For any (1 + , 1+1− ,
1
 )-El Farol game, by Theorem 1, we obtain x
∗ =
1 + 2 − √1 + 2 and f(x∗) = 1 + −√1− 2. Then we have
p =
(1− (1 + 2 − √1 + 2))(1− (1 + −√1− 2))
(1− (1 + 2 − √1 + 2))(1− (1 + −√1− 2)) +  .
Also we have y∗ = 1−  and f(y∗) = 0 for  ≤ 12 . Thus we have
lim
→0
EV = lim
→0
p+ (1− p)(x∗f(x∗) + (1− x∗))
y∗f(y∗) + (1− y∗) =∞.
uunionsq
Fig. 2. NE, MED, OPT, MV and EV with respect to s1 and s2.
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Fig. 3. NE, MED, OPT, MV and EV with respect to c/s1.
Based on these results, we show in Figures 2 and 3 the social cost of the best
Nash equilibrium (NE), the expected social cost of our optimal mediator (MED)
and the optimal social cost (OPT), normalized by n, with respect to s1, s2 and
c/s1. Also we show the corresponding Mediation Value (MV ) and Enforcement
Value (EV ).
In Figure 2, the left plot shows that for c = 2 and s2 = 10, the values of NE,
MED, OPT increase, each up to a certain point, when s1 increases; however,
the values of MV and EV decrease when s1 increases. Moreover, MV reaches
its peak at the point where the best Nash equilibrium starts to remain constant
with respect to s1. In the right plot, we set c = 2 and s1 = 2.25; it shows that
the values of NE, MED, OPT, MV and EV increase, each up to a certain point,
when s2 increases.
Figure 3 illustrates Corollaries 2 and 3, and it shows how fast MV and EV go
to infinity with respect to c/s1, where c/s1 = 1− . The left plot shows that for
any (2 + , 2+1− ,
1
 )-El Farol game, as c/s1 → 1 (→ 0), MV →∞ and EV → 2.
In the right plot, for any (1 + , 1+1− ,
1
 )-El Farol game, as c/s1 → 1 ( → 0),
EV →∞ and MV → 2.
Note that for any (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game, if c/s1 = 1, then the best corre-
lated equilibrium is at which all players would rather go with a social cost of 0,
that is the best Nash equilibrium as well. Therefore, once c/s1 is equal to 1, MV
drops to 1.
The cost to stay assumption
Now we justify our assumption that the cost to stay is unity. Let (c′, s′1, s
′
2, t
′)-El
Farol game be a variant of (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game, where 0 < c
′ < s′1, s
′ > 0
and the cost to stay is t′ > 0. If x is the fraction of players to go, then the cost
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f ′(x) for any player to go is as follows:
f ′(x) =
{
c′ − s′1x 0 ≤ x ≤ c
′
s′1
,
s′2(x− c
′
s′1
) c
′
s′1
≤ x ≤ 1.
The following lemma shows that any (c′, s′1, s
′
2, t
′)-El Farol game can be reduced
to a (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game.
Lemma 3. Any (c′, s′1, s
′
2, t
′)-El Farol game can be reduced to a (c, s1, s2)-El
Farol game that has the same Mediation Value and Enforcement Value, where
c = c
′
t′ , s1 =
s′1
t′ and s2 =
s′2
t′ .
Proof. In a manner similar to Theorem (1), for any (c′, s′1, s
′
2, t
′)-El Farol game,
if c > t′, then the best correlated equilibrium is D{(C(0), p′), (C(x′), 1 − p′)},
where λ′(c′, s′1, s
′
2, t
′) = c′( 1s′1 +
1
s′2
)−
√
c′( 1
s′1
+ 1
s′2
)(c′−t′)
s′2
;
x′ =

λ′(c′, s′1, s
′
2, t
′) if c
′
s′1
≤ λ′(c′, s′1, s′2, t′) < 1,
c′
s′1
if λ′(c′, s′1, s
′
2, t
′) < c
′
s′1
,
1 otherwise.
and p′ = (1−x
′)(t′−f(x′))
(1−x′)(t′−f(x′))+c′−t′ . Moreover,
1) the Mediation Value (MV ′) is min (f
′(1),t′)
p′t′+(1−p′)(x′f(x′)+(1−x′)t′) and
2) the Enforcement Value (EV ′) is p
′t′+(1−p′)(x′f(x′)+(1−x′)t′)
y′f(y′)+(1−y′)t′ , where
y′ =

1
2 (
c′
s′1
+ t
′
s′2
) if c
′
s′1
≤ 12 ( c
′
s′1
+ t
′
s′2
) ≤ 1,
c′
s′1
if t
′
s′2
< c
′
s′1
,
1 otherwise.
.
Similarly, for c ≤ t′, we have MV ′ = 1 and EV ′ = min (f ′(1),t′)y′f(y′)+(1−y′)t′ .
For both cases, by Theorem 1, if we set c = c′/t′, s1 = s′1/t
′ and s2 =
s′2/t
′, then we have f ′(1) = f(1) · t′; also we get y′ = y∗ and λ′(c′, s′1, s′2, t′) =
λ(c, s1, s2). This implies that f
′(y′) = f(y∗) · t′ and x′ = x∗; which in turn
f ′(x′) = f(x∗) · t′ and p′ = p. Thus, we obtain MV ′ = MV and EV ′ = EV . uunionsq
5 Conclusion
We have extended the traditional El Farol game to have both negative and
positive network effects. We have described an optimal mediator, and we have
measured the Mediation Value and the Enforcement Value to completely char-
acterize the benefit of our mediator with respect to the best Nash equilibrium
and the optimal social cost.
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Several open questions remain including the following: can we generalize our
results for our game where the players choose among k > 2 actions? How many
configurations are required to design an optimal mediator when there are k > 2
actions? Another problem is characterizing the MV and EV values for our game
with the more powerful mediators in [2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11]. How much would these
more powerful mediators reduce the social cost over our type of weaker mediator?
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A Appendix - Proof of Theorem 1
First of all, we call a mediator over k configurations when the configuration
distribution this mediator uses has k configurations.
The proof has four main parts. The first part is The Reduction of Mediators
for c > 1, where we prove that if c > 1, then for any optimal mediator over
k > 2 configurations, there is a mediator over two configurations that has the
same social cost. The second part is The Reduction of Mediators for c ≤ 1,
where we prove that if c ≤ 1, then the best correlated equilibrium is the best
Nash equilibrium. The third part is An Optimal Mediator, where we describe
an optimal mediator for any arbitrary constants c, s1 and s2. Finally, the fourth
part is The Mediation Metrics, where we measure the Mediation Value and the
Enforcement Value.
Recall that xi is the fraction of players that are advised to go in configura-
tion C(xi) which is selected with probability pi in a configuration distribution,
D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xk), pk)}, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We define ∆(xi) = 1−f(xi), where
f(xi) is defined in Equation (1).
A.1 The Reduction of Mediators for c > 1
In this section, we consider the case that c > 1.
Lemma 4 For any mediator over k configurations, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, ∆(xi) > 0
iff ( c−1s1 < xi <
1
s2
+ cs1 and f(1) ≥ 1) or ( c−1s1 < xi ≤ 1 and f(1) < 1); and
∆(xi) < 0 iff 0 ≤ xi < c−1s1 or ( 1s2 + cs1 < xi ≤ 1 and f(1) > 1).
Proof. Recall that ∆(xi) = 1− f(xi). Then by Equation (1), we have
∆(xi) =
{
∆1(xi) 0 ≤ xi ≤ cs1 ,
∆2(xi)
c
s1
≤ xi ≤ 1.
where ∆1(xi) = 1 − (c − s1xi) and ∆2(xi) = 1 − s2(xi − cs1 ). Now we make a
case analysis:
Case 1: 0 ≤ xi ≤ cs1 : ∆1(xi) < 0⇐⇒ 0 ≤ xi < c−1s1 ; and ∆1(xi) > 0⇐⇒ c−1s1 <
xi ≤ cs1 .
Case 2: cs1 ≤ xi ≤ 1: ∆2(xi) > 0 ⇐⇒ ( cs1 ≤ xi < 1s2 + cs1 and f(1) ≥ 1) or
( cs1 ≤ xi ≤ 1 and f(1) < 1); and ∆2(xi) < 0⇐⇒ ( 1s2 + cs1 < xi ≤ 1 and f(1) >
1). uunionsq
Lemma 5 D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xk), pk)} is a correlated equilibrium iff
k∑
i=1
pixi∆(xi) ≥ 0 (2)
and
k∑
i=1
pi(1− xi)∆(xi) ≤ 0. (3)
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Proof. Recall that E iG is the event that the mediator advises player i to go, CiG
is the cost for player i to go, E iS is the event that the mediator advises player
i to stay, and CiS is the cost for player i to stay. Also we will omit the index i
since the players are symmetric.
By definition, D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xk), pk)} is a correlated equilibrium iff
E [CS |EG] ≥ E [CG|EG],
E [CG|ES ] ≥ E [CS |ES ].
Note that:
E [CS |EG] = 1,
E [CG|EG] =
∑k
i=1 pif(xi)xi∑k
i=1 pixi
,
E [CG|ES ] =
∑k
i=1 pif(xi)(1− xi)∑k
i=1 pi(1− xi)
and
E(CS |ES) = 1.
Therefore, D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xk), pk)} is a correlated equilibrium iff∑k
i=1 pif(xi)xi∑k
i=1 pixi
≤ 1 (4)
and ∑k
i=1 pif(xi)(1− xi)∑k
i=1 pi(1− xi)
≥ 1. (5)
By rearranging Inequalities (4) and (5), we have
k∑
i=1
pixi(1− f(xi)) ≥ 0
and
k∑
i=1
pi(1− xi)(1− f(xi)) ≤ 0.
uunionsq
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Lemma 6 The expected social cost of D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xk), pk)} is
(1−
k∑
i=1
pixi∆(xi))n.
Proof. Let Cost(C(xi)) be the cost of configuration C(xi) in D{(C(x1), p1), ..,
(C(xk), pk)}, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We know that the expected social cost ofD{(C(x1), p1)
, .., (C(xk), pk)} is
k∑
i=1
piCost(C(xi)).
We have Cost(C(xi)) = (xif(xi) + (1 − xi))n, and since ∆(xi) = 1 − f(xi), it
follows that Cost(C(xi)) = (1 − xi∆(xi))n. Therefore, the expected social cost
is
k∑
i=1
pi(1− xi∆(xi))n,
or equivalently,
(
k∑
i=1
pi −
k∑
i=1
pixi∆(xi))n.
Finally, we note that
∑k
i=1 pi = 1. uunionsq
Lemma 7 For any optimal mediator over k ≥ 2 configurations, ∆(xi) 6= 0 for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and ∆(xu) > 0 and ∆(xv) < 0 for some 1 ≤ u, v ≤ k.
Proof. First we show that for any optimal mediator over k ≥ 2 configurations,
∆(xi) is non-zero for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Assume by way of contradiction that there
is an optimal mediator Mk that uses D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xk), pk)}, and there
is some 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that ∆(xj) = 0. Recall that 0 < pj < 1. Now let
D{(C(x1), p11−pj ), .., (C(xj−1),
pj−1
1−pj ), (C(xj+1),
pj+1
1−pj ), .., (C(xk),
pk
1−pj )} be a con-
figuration distribution over k − 1 configurations.
Since Mk is a mediator and ∆(xj) = 0, Constraints (2) and (3) of Lemma 5
imply that ∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pixi∆(xi) ≥ 0
and ∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi(1− xi)∆(xi) ≤ 0.
Now if we multiply both sides of these two constraints by 11−pj , we have∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi
1− pj xi∆(xi) ≥ 0
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and ∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi
1− pj (1− xi)∆(xi) ≤ 0.
By Lemma 5,D{(C(x1), p11−pj ), .., (C(xj−1),
pj−1
1−pj ), (C(xj+1),
pj+1
1−pj ), .., (C(xk),
pk
1−pj )}
is a correlated equilibrium. Let Mk−1 be a mediator that uses this correlated
equilibrium. By Lemma 6, the expected social cost of Mk−1 is
(1− 1
1− pj
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pixi∆(xi))n,
and since ∆(xj) = 0, the expected social cost of Mk is
(1−
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pixi∆(xi))n.
We know that 0 < pj < 1 implies
1
1−pj > 1. Therefore, the expected social cost
Mk−1 is less than the expected social cost of Mk. This contradicts the fact that
Mk is optimal.
Recall that 0 < pi < 1 and 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By Lemma 5, Constraint
(2) implies that there exists u such that ∆(xu) > 0 for 1 ≤ u ≤ k. Similarly,
Constraint (3) implies that there exists v such that ∆(xv) < 0 for 1 ≤ v ≤ k. uunionsq
Lemma 8 Any optimal mediator that uses D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xj), pj), ..,
(C(xk), pk)}, where k ≥ 2, has∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi∆(xi)(xi − xj) ≥ 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
Proof. Let Mk be an optimal mediator that uses D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xj), pj), ..,
(C(xk), pk)}. We know by Lemma 7 that any configuration, C(xj), has either
∆(xj) < 0 or ∆(xj) > 0, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Now fix any 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and do a case
analysis for ∆(xj).
Case 1: If ∆(xj) < 0, then by repeated application of Lemma 5 we have∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j pi∆(xi)(1− xi)
(1− xj)|∆(xj)| ≤ pj ≤
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j pi∆(xi)xi
xj |∆(xj)| (6)
Removing pj from Inequality (6) and rearranging, we get
xj |∆(xj)|
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi∆(xi)(1− xi) ≤ (1− xj)|∆(xj)|
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi∆(xi)xi.
By canceling the common terms, we have∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi∆(xi)xj ≤
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi∆(xi)xi.
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Case 2: If ∆(xj) > 0, then similarly by repeated application of Lemma 5 we
have
−∑1≤i≤k,i 6=j pi∆(xi)xi
xj∆(xj)
≤ pj ≤
−∑1≤i≤k,i 6=j pi∆(xi)(1− xi)
(1− xj)∆(xj) (7)
Removing pj from Inequality (7) and rearranging, we get
xj∆(xj)
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi∆(xi)(1− xi) ≤ (1− xj)∆(xj)
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi∆(xi)xi.
By canceling the common terms, we have∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi∆(xi)xj ≤
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi∆(xi)xi.
Since j is any value between 1 and k, this implies the statement of the lemma
for every such j. uunionsq
Lemma 9 Consider any mediator Mk that uses D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xj), pj), ..,
(C(xk), pk)}, where 0 < xj < c−1s1 . Then there exists a mediator M ′k of less ex-
pected social cost, which uses D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(x′j), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)}, where
x′j = 0.
Proof. LetMk be a mediator that usesD{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xj), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)},
where 0 < xj <
c−1
s1
. By Lemma 5, we have
pjxj∆(xj) +
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pixi∆(xi) ≥ 0 (8)
and
pj(1− xj)∆(xj) +
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi(1− xi)∆(xi) ≤ 0. (9)
Since 0 < xj <
c−1
s1
, by Lemma 4, ∆(xj) < 0. Now let D{(C(x1), p1), ..,
(C(x′j), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)} be a configuration distribution that has x′j = 0. Thus,
we have pjx
′
j∆(x
′
j) = 0 and pjxj∆(xj) < 0. By Inequality (8), we have
pjx
′
j∆(x
′
j) +
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pixi∆(xi) > 0. (10)
We know that ∆(x′j) < ∆(xj) < 0 and (1 − x′j) > (1 − xj) > 0, so we have
(1− x′j)∆(x′j) < (1− xj)∆(xj). By Inequality (9), we get
pj∆(x
′
j) +
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi(1− xi)∆(xi) < 0. (11)
Now by Lemma 5 and Inequalities (10) and (11), D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(x′j), pj)
, .., (C(xk), pk)} is a correlated equilibrium. Let M ′k be a mediator that uses this
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correlated equilibrium. By Lemma 6, and since x′j = 0, the expected social cost
of M ′k is
(1−
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pixi∆(xi))n.
Moreover, by Lemma 6, the expected social cost of Mk is
((1−
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pixi∆(xi))− pjxj∆(xj))n.
Since ∆(xj) < 0 and xj > 0, the expected social cost of M
′
k is less than the
expected social cost of Mk. uunionsq
Lemma 10 For f(1) ≥ 1, consider any mediator Mk that uses D{(C(x1), p1), ..,
(C(xj), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)}, where c−1s1 < xj < cs1 . Then there exists a mediator
M ′k of less expected social cost, which uses D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(x′j), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)},
where cs1 < x
′
j <
c
s1
+ 1s2 and f(x
′
j) = f(xj).
Proof. LetMk be a mediator that usesD{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xj), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)},
where c−1s1 < xj <
c
s1
. By Lemma 5, we have
pjxj∆(xj) +
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pixi∆(xi) ≥ 0 (12)
and
pj(1− xj)∆(xj) +
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi(1− xi)∆(xi) ≤ 0. (13)
Recall that c−1s1 < xj <
c
s1
and f(1) ≥ 1. Then ∃x′j : cs1 < x′j < cs1 + 1s2
and f(x′j) = f(xj). Now let D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(x′j), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)} be a
configuration distribution. Since f(x′j) = f(xj), ∆(x
′
j) = ∆(xj). We know that
x′j > xj , then x
′
j∆(x
′
j) > xj∆(xi). By Inequality (12), we obtain
pjx
′
j∆(x
′
j) +
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pixi∆(xi) > 0.
Since (1−x′j) < (1−xj), we have (1−x′j)∆(x′j) < (1−xj)∆(xj). By Inequality
(13), we get
pj(1− x′j)∆(x′j) +
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi(1− xi)∆(xi) < 0.
Now by Lemma 5, D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(x′j), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)} is a correlated
equilibrium. Let M ′k be a mediator that uses this correlated equilibrium. By
Lemma 6, the expected social cost of M ′k is
((1−
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pixi∆(xi))− pjx′j∆(x′j))n,
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and the expected social cost of Mk is
((1−
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pixi∆(xi))− pjxj∆(xj))n.
Since pjx
′
j∆(x
′
j) > pjxj∆(xi), the expected social cost of M
′
k is less than the
expected social cost of Mk. uunionsq
Lemma 11 For f(1) < 1, consider any mediator Mk that uses D{(C(x1), p1), ..,
(C(xj), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)}, where c−1s1 < xj < cs1 and f(xj) ≤ f(1). Then there
exists a mediator M ′k of less expected social cost, which uses D{(C(x1), p1), ..,
(C(x′j), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)}, where cs1 < x′j ≤ 1 and f(x′j) = f(xj).
Proof. We know that for c−1s1 < xj <
c
s1
and f(xj) ≤ f(1) < 1, ∃x′j : cs1 < x′j ≤ 1
and f(x′j) = f(xj). In a manner similar to the proof of Lemma 10, we prove this
Lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 12 For f(1) < 1, consider any mediator Mk that uses D{(C(x1), p1), ..,
(C(xj), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)}, where c−1s1 < xj < cs1 and f(xj) > f(1). Then there
exists a mediator M ′k of less expected social cost, which uses D{(C(x1), p1), ..,
(C(x′j), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)}, where x′j = 1.
Proof. LetMk be a mediator that usesD{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xj), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)},
where c−1s1 < xj <
c
s1
. By Lemma 5, we have
pjxj∆(xj) +
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pixi∆(xi) ≥ 0 (14)
and
pj(1− xj)∆(xj) +
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi(1− xi)∆(xi) ≤ 0. (15)
Now let D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(x′j), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)} be a configuration dis-
tribution, where x′j = 1. For f(xj) > f(x
′
j) and f(x
′
j) < 1, ∆(x
′
j) > ∆(xj). We
know that x′j > xj , then x
′
j∆(x
′
j) > xj∆(xi). By Inequality (14), we obtain
pjx
′
j∆(x
′
j) +
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pixi∆(xi) > 0.
Since (1− x′j) = 0, (1− xj) > 0 and ∆(xj) > 0, (1− x′j)∆(x′j) < (1− xj)∆(xj).
By Inequality (15), we get
pj(1− x′j)∆(x′j) +
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pi(1− xi)∆(xi) < 0.
Now by Lemma 5, D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(x′j), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)} is a correlated
equilibrium. Let M ′k be a mediator that uses this correlated equilibrium. By
Lemma 6, the expected social cost of M ′k is
((1−
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pixi∆(xi))− pjx′j∆(x′j))n,
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and the expected social cost of Mk is
((1−
∑
1≤i≤k,i 6=j
pixi∆(xi))− pjxj∆(xj))n.
Since pjx
′
j∆(x
′
j) > pjxj∆(xi), the expected social cost of M
′
k is less than the
expected social cost of Mk. uunionsq
Lemma 13. For any (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game, any optimal mediator that uses
D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xk), pk)} has exactly one configuration that has no players
advised to go, and any other configuration has at least a cs1 -fraction of players
advised to go.
Proof. Let Mk be an optimal mediator over k ≥ 2 configurations that uses
D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xj), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)}. First we prove that Mk must have
a configuration where no players advised to go. We know by Lemma 7 that
there exists some 1 ≤ j ≤ k where ∆(xj) < 0. By Lemma 4, ∆(xj) < 0 iff
(xj ∈ (1/s2 + c/s1, 1] and f(1) > 1) or xj ∈ [0, c−1s1 ). Now we do a case analysis
for xj .
Case 1: xj ∈ (1/s2+c/s1, 1] and f(1) > 1. Assume by way of contradiction that
Mk has no configuration that has less than a
c−1
s1
-fraction of players advised to
go. Let xq be the smallest fraction that is xq > 1/s2 + c/s1, where 1 ≤ q ≤ k.
By Lemmas 4 and 7, for 1 ≤ r ≤ k,
∆(xr) =
{
> 0 if xr < xq,
< 0 otherwise.
Note that by the definition of the configuration distribution, if xr = xq then
r = q. Therefore, we have ∑
1≤r≤k,r 6=q
pr∆(xr)(xr − xq) < 0. (16)
By Lemma 8, Inequality (16) contradicts that Mk is an optimal mediator. Thus,
Mk must have a configuration, C(x), where x <
c−1
s1
, and the rest of the argument
is as in Case 2.
Case 2: xj ∈ [0, c−1s1 ). By Lemma 9, and since Mk is an optimal mediator,
xj = 0.
By the definition of the configuration distribution, Mk has no two configu-
rations that have the same fraction of players that are advised to go. So Mk
has exactly one configuration, over all the k configurations, that has no players
advised to go.
We know that ∆( c−1s1 ) = 0. By Lemma 7, there is no optimal mediator that
has a configuration C( c−1s1 ). Now since Mk is an optimal mediator, by Lemmas
9, 10, 11 and 12, Mk has no configuration in which an x-fraction of players is
advised to go, where x ∈ (0, cs1 ). uunionsq
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Lemma 14 For any D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xi), pi), .., (C(xj), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)},
and for any arbitrary xi and xj such that xj > xi ≥ cs1 , there exists D{(C(x1), p1),
.., (C(xi−1), pi−1), (C(xi+1), pi+1), .., (C(x′j), pi+pj), .., (C(xk), pk)}, where x′j =
pi
pi+pj
xi +
pj
pi+pj
xj. Moreover,
1) (pi + pj)x
′
j∆(x
′
j) > pixi∆(xi) + pjxj∆(xj).
2) (pi + pj)(1− x′j)∆(x′j) < pi(1− xi)∆(xi) + pj(1− xj)∆(xj).
Proof. Let D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xi), pi), .., (C(xj), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)} be a con-
figuration distribution that has xj > xi ≥ cs1 .
Also letD{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xi−1), pi−1), (C(xi+1), pi+1), .., (C(x′j), pi+pj), ..,
(C(xk), pk)} be a configuration distribution that has x′j = pipi+pj xi +
pj
pi+pj
xj .
We know that 0 < pi, pj < 1 and xj > xi. Thus xi < x
′
j < xj . Assume by way
of contradiction that
(pi + pj)x
′
j∆(x
′
j) ≤ pixi∆(xi) + pjxj∆(xj),
or equivalently,
x′j∆(x
′
j) ≤
pi
pi + pj
xi∆(xi) +
pj
pi + pj
xj∆(xj).
Let p = pipi+pj , so 1− p =
pj
pi+pj
. Then we have
x′j∆(x
′
j) ≤ pxi∆(xi) + (1− p)xj∆(xj).
Recall that for cs1 ≤ x ≤ 1, ∆(x) = 1− s2(x− cs1 ). Since cs1 ≤ xi, xj , x′j ≤ 1, we
get
x′j(1− s2(x′j −
c
s1
)) ≤ pxi(1− s2(xi − c
s1
)) + (1− p)xj(1− s2(xj − c
s1
)).
Since x′j = pxi + (1− p)xj , we have
x′j(−s2(x′j −
c
s1
)) ≤ pxi(−s2(xi − c
s1
)) + (1− p)xj(−s2(xj − c
s1
)).
We know that s2 > 0, and hence dividing by −s2, we get
x′j(x
′
j −
c
s1
) ≥ pxi(xi − c
s1
) + (1− p)xj(xj − c
s1
).
Since − cs1x′j = − cs1 (pxi + (1− p)xj), we have
x′2j ≥ px2i + (1− p)x2j .
Substituting x′j by pxi + (1− p)xj , we get
p2x2i + 2p(1− p)xixj + (1− p)2x2j ≥ px2i + (1− p)x2j .
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By rearranging, we have
p(1− p)(x2j − 2xixj + x2i ) ≤ 0.
Now since 0 < p < 1, we can divide by p(1− p), and we get
(xj − xi)2 ≤ 0,
which contradicts since xj 6= xi. This proves that
(pi + pj)x
′
j∆(x
′
j) > pixi∆(xi) + pjxj∆(xj). (17)
Now we prove that (pi + pj)(1− x′j)∆(x′j) < pi(1− xi)∆(xi) + pj(1− xj)∆(xj).
To do so, we first show that (pi + pj)∆(x
′
j) = pi∆(xi) + pj∆(xj).
We know that
x′j =
pi
pi + pj
xi +
pj
pi + pj
xj
⇐⇒ (pi + pj)x′j = pixi + pjxj
⇐⇒ (pi + pj)(x′j −
c
s1
) = pi(xi − c
s1
) + pj(xj − c
s1
)
⇐⇒ (pi + pj)s2(x′j −
c
s1
) = pis2(xi − c
s1
) + pjs2(xj − c
s1
)
⇐⇒ (pi + pj)(1− s2(x′j −
c
s1
)) = pi(1− s2(xi − c
s1
)) + pj(1− s2(xj − c
s1
))
Recall that ∆(x) = 1 − s2(x − cs1 ) when cs1 ≤ x ≤ 1. Since cs1 ≤ xi, xj , x′j ≤ 1,
we get
(pi + pj)∆(x
′
j) = pi∆(xi) + pj∆(xj). (18)
By subtracting (17) from (18), we obtain
(pi + pj)(1− x′j)∆(x′j) < pi(1− xi)∆(xi) + pj(1− xj)∆(xj).
uunionsq
Lemma 15. For any (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game, any optimal mediator that uses
D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xk), pk)} has at most one configuration that has at least a
c
s1
-fraction of players advised to go, and any other configuration has less than a
c
s1
-fraction of players advised to go.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that there is an optimal mediator Mk
that uses D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xi), pi), .., (C(xj), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)}, where xj >
xi ≥ cs1 . LetD{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xi−1), pi−1), (C(xi+1), pi+1), .., (C(x′j), pi+pj),
.., (C(xk), pk)} be a configuration distribution that has x′j = pipi+pj xi +
pj
pi+pj
xj .
Since Mk is a mediator, by Lemma 5, we have
pixi∆(xi) + pjxj∆(xj) +
∑
1≤r≤k,r 6=i,r 6=j
prxr∆(xr) ≥ 0 (19)
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and
pi(1− xi)∆(xi) + pj(1− xj)∆(xj) +
∑
1≤r≤k,r 6=i,r 6=j
pr(1− xr)∆(xr) ≤ 0. (20)
By Lemma 14, we have
(pi + pj)x
′
j∆(x
′
j) > pixi∆(xi) + pjxj∆(xj) (21)
and
(pi + pj)(1− x′j)∆(x′j) < pi(1− xi)∆(xi) + pj(1− xj)∆(xj). (22)
By Inequalities (19) and (21), we get
(pi + pj)x
′
j∆(x
′
j) +
∑
1≤r≤k,r 6=i,r 6=j
prxr∆(xr) > 0. (23)
Similarly, by Inequalities (20) and (22), we obtain
(pi + pj)(1− x′j)∆(x′j) +
∑
1≤r≤k,r 6=i,r 6=j
pr(1− xr)∆(xr) < 0. (24)
By Lemma 5 and Inequalities (23) and (24), D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xi−1), pi−1),
(C(xi+1), pi+1), .., (C(x
′
j), pi+pj), .., (C(xk), pk)} is a correlated equilibrium. Let
Mk−1 be a mediator that uses this correlated equilibrium. By Lemma 6, the
expected social cost of Mk is
((1−
∑
1≤r≤k,r 6=i,r 6=j
prxr∆(xr))− pixi∆(xi)− pjxj∆(xj))n,
and the expected social cost of Mk−1 is
((1−
∑
1≤r≤k,r 6=i,r 6=j
prxr∆(xr))− (pi + pj)x′j∆(x′j))n.
Since (pi + pj)x
′
j∆(x
′
j) > pixi∆(xi) + pjxj∆(xj), the expected social cost of
Mk−1 is less than the expected social cost of Mk. This contradicts that Mk is
an optimal mediator. uunionsq
Lemma 16. For any (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game, there exists an optimal mediator
that uses D{(C(0), p), (C(x), 1− p)}, where 0 < p < 1; and cs1 ≤ x < 1s2 + cs1 if
f(1) ≥ 1, otherwise cs1 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Proof. By the definition of the configuration distribution, a mediator has at least
two configurations. By Lemmas 13 and 15, there exists an optimal mediator that
has exactly two configurations. The first configuration has no players advised to
go, and the second configuration has an x-fraction of players advised to go, where
x ≥ cs1 . Since the first configuration has zero players advised to go, by Lemma
4, ∆(0) < 0. By Lemma 7, we must have ∆(x) > 0. We know that x ≥ cs1 . By
Lemma 4, if f(1) ≥ 1, then cs1 ≤ x < 1s2 + cs1 ; otherwise, cs1 ≤ x ≤ 1. uunionsq
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A.2 The Reduction of Mediators for c ≤ 1
Now we consider the case that c ≤ 1 in the following lemma.
Lemma 17. For any (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game , if c ≤ 1, then MV = 1.
Proof. In a manner similar to Lemma 7, any optimal mediator over k ≥ 2 does
not have a configuration C(x) with ∆(x) = 0.
Also in a manner similar to Lemmas 10, 11 and 12, for any mediator Mk
that uses D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xj), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)}, where 0 ≤ xj < cs1 , there
exists a mediator M ′k of less expected social cost, which uses D{(C(x1), p1), ..,
(C(x′j), pj), .., (C(xk), pk)}, where cs1 ≤ x′j < 1s2 + cs1 if f(1) ≥ 1; otherwise,
c
s1
≤ x′j ≤ 1.
Finally, in a manner similar to Lemma 15, any optimal mediator has at most
one configuration, C(x), where x ≥ cs1 .
Therefore, for c ≤ 1, the best correlated equilibrium is a configuration distri-
bution over just one configuration, which is trivially the best Nash equilibrium.
A.3 An Optimal Mediator
We have proved that for any (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game, if c ≤ 1 then the best
correlated equilibrium is the best Nash equilibrium; otherwise, there exists an
optimal mediator that is over two configurations. Now we describe this mediator
in detail.
Lemma 18. For any (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game, if c > 1, then D{(C(0), p), (C(x), 1−
p)} is the best correlated equilibrium, where λ(c, s1, s2) = c( 1s1 + 1s2 )−
√
c( 1s1
+ 1s2
)(c−1)
s2
,
x =

λ(c, s1, s2) if
c
s1
≤ λ(c, s1, s2) < 1,
c
s1
if λ(c, s1, s2) <
c
s1
,
1 otherwise.
and p = (1−x)(1−f(x))(1−x)(1−f(x))+c−1 . Moreover, the expected social cost is
(p+ (1− p)(xf(x) + (1− x)))n.
Proof. By Lemma 16, there exists an optimal mediatorM2 that usesD{(C(0), p),
(C(x), 1− p)}, where cs1 ≤ x < 1s2 + cs1 if f(1) ≥ 1; otherwise, cs1 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Now we determine p and x so that M2 is an optimal mediator.
First, we determine p. By Constraint (3) of Lemma 5, we have
p∆(0) + (1− p)(1− x)∆(x) ≤ 0. (25)
We know that c > 1, ∆(0) = 1 − c and ∆(x) > 0. By rearranging Inequality
(25), we obtain
p ≥ (1− x)∆(x)
(c− 1) + (1− x)∆(x) . (26)
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Recall that the cost of any configuration, C(xi), is Cost(C(xi)) = (1−xi∆(xi))n.
Thus Cost(C(0)) = n, and Cost(C(x)) = (1 − x∆(x))n. Since ∆(x) > 0,
Cost(C(x)) < n. Thus, Cost(C(x)) < Cost(C(0)). We know that the social
cost of M2 is
pCost(C(0)) + (1− p)Cost(C(x)). (27)
Since Cost(C(x)) < Cost(C(0)), the minimum expected social cost is when p is
the smallest possible value in Inequality (26) which is (1−x)∆(x)(c−1)+(1−x)∆(x) .
Now we determine x. By Lemma 6, the expected social cost of M2 is
(1− (1− p)x∆(x))n.
Since p = (1−x)∆(x)(c−1)+(1−x)∆(x) , the expected social cost is then
(1− (c− 1)x∆(x)
(c− 1) + (1− x)∆(x) )n.
As M2 is an optimal mediator, we minimize its expected social cost with
respect to x. Thus g(x) is maximized with respect to x, where
g(x) =
(c− 1)x∆(x)
(c− 1) + (1− x)∆(x) .
Hence, we have
dg(x)
dx
=
(c− 1)[(c− 1 + (1− x)∆(x))(∆(x)− s2x) + x∆(x)((1− x)s2 +∆(x))]
((c− 1) + (1− x)∆(x))2 .
By rearranging and canceling common terms, we obtain
dg(x)
dx
=
(c− 1)[(∆(x))2 + (c− 1)∆(x)− (c− 1)s2x]
((c− 1) + (1− x)∆(x))2 .
We know that ∆(x) > 0, cs1 ≤ x < cs1 + 1s2 , x ≤ 1 and c > 1, so the
denominator is always positive. By setting the numerator to zero and dividing
by c− 1, we get
(∆(x))2 + (c− 1)∆(x)− (c− 1)s2x = 0 (28)
By solving Equation (28), we have x = c( 1s1 +
1
s2
) ±
√
c( 1s1
+ 1s2
)(c−1)
s2
. Now
let λ(c, s1, s2) = c(
1
s1
+ 1s2 ) −
√
c( 1s1
+ 1s2
)(c−1)
s2
and λ¯(c, s1, s2) = (c(
1
s1
+ 1s2 ) +√
c( 1s1
+ 1s2
)(c−1)
s2
).
Since λ¯(c, s1, s2) > (
1
s2
+ cs1 ), by Lemma 16, it is out of range. Therefore, we
have exactly one root x = λ(c, s1, s2).
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We know dg(x)dx |(x= cs1 )< 0 iff λ(c, s1, s2) <
c
s1
, and dg(x)dx |(x=1)> 0 iff
λ(c, s1, s2) > 1. Also we know that λ(c, s1, s2) <
c
s1
+ 1s2 ; and
c
s1
≤ x < 1s2 + cs1
if f(1) ≥ 1, otherwise, cs1 ≤ x ≤ 1. Therefore, for cs1 ≤ λ(c, s1, s2) ≤ 1, the
maximum of g(x) is at x = λ(c, s1, s2). Moreover, if λ(c, s1, s2) <
c
s1
, then the
maximum of g(x) is at x = cs1 ; and for λ(c, s1, s2) > 1, the maximum is at x = 1.
Recall that the expected social cost of D{(C(0), p), (C(x), 1− p)} is
pCost(C(0)) + (1− p)Cost(C(x)),
or equivalently,
(p+ (1− p)(xf(x) + (1− x)))n.
uunionsq
A.4 The Mediation Metrics
Now we compute the Mediation Value and the Enforcement Value. To obtain the
Mediation Value and Enforcement Value; recall that the Mediation Value (MV )
is the ratio of the minimum social cost over all Nash equilibria to the minimum
social cost over all mediators, and the Enforcement Value is the ratio of the
minimum social cost over all mediators to the optimal social cost.
For c ≤ 1, by Lemma 17, MV = 1; and by Lemmas 1 and 2, EV = min(f(1),1)yf(y)+(1−y) .
For c > 1, by Lemmas 2 and 18, the Mediation Value is:
min(f(1), 1)
p+ (1− p)(xf(x) + (1− x)) ;
and by Lemmas 1 and 18, the Enforcement Value is:
p+ (1− p)(xf(x) + (1− x))
yf(y) + (1− y) .
